C CONG RUE CE BETWEEN T HE PUBLIC LAW TEST OF ULT RA VIRE S AN D TH E SCOP E OF TH E DEFENCE OF
2 One would have expected the confusion to have been resolved before the advent of the next millennium. Instead, it has been compounded.
Principally responsible, perhaps, is Parliament. Having decided that the Crown should no longer be immune from suit, it simply waived sovereign immunity completely. 3 It further assigned governmental functions to statutory bodies, which it subjected to tort liability. 4 The statutes which effected these changes made no provision for the differences between the government 5 and private individuals. Nor did they address the potential for the expansion of tort liability which existed following M'Alister (or Donoghue) v
Stevenson. 6 The question of whether rules limiting the government's liability in tort were to be developed was left entirely to the courts. Redress Act 1881. Such actions were, however, confined to damage caused by public works, which were defined bys 37(3) as such things as railways, roads and bridges. The 1881 Act was repealed and replaced by the Crown Suits Act 1908. Section 25 of the 1908 Act together with s 3(c) of the Crown Suits Amendment Act 1910 ex'Posed the Crown to liability for all torts. TI1e 1908 Act was in tum replaced by the Crown Proceedings Act 1950, s 6(l)(a) of which makes the Crown liable in tort but only where an individual in its place would be liable for torts committed by its servants. In England, sovereign immunity was not waived until tJ1e passing oftJ1e Crown Proceedings Act 1947. 4 For exan1ple, tmder s 37L(4) oftJ1e Local Government Act 1974 territorial autllorities are bodies corporate and are "capable . . . of suing and being sued". Section 9(2) of tlle Securities Act 1978 makes similar provision in respect of tJ1e Securities Conunission. 5 This tenn will be used to refer to tlle Crown and all agencies tmder its control. Generally, the courts, and the English courts in particular, have failed to produce rules which achieve the aim of avoiding tort liability where it would interfere with governmental functions but of permitting it elsewhere. There is a notable absence of reasoning in support of some of the rules adopted. And, while most courts purport to follow precedent, they frequently depart from previous authorities without making this explicit. Confusion has resulted not least because the same concepts have been assigned different meanings by different courts.
A principled reformulation of the rules governing liability is urgently required . The law in this important area should be clear. Furthermore, a rule which is intended to immunise policy decisions but which extends immunity too far has serious consequences for those harmed by government activity. A striking illustration is provided by the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council.
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The defendant council removed the plaintiff from his mother while a child and took him into its care pursuant to its statutory powers. He was relocated nine times, he was unable to develop a relationship with his family, and his psychiatric illness was not treated . The plaintiff sued in negligence, alleging that the defendant carelessly failed to exercise various statutory powers, including its power to place him for adoption . Secondly, a discretionary decision will be immunised unless it is irrational. Lord
Browne-Wilkinson expressly rejected the possibility that any of the other heads of judicial review could defeat the immunity.
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Thirdly, where the allocation of finite resources or the balance between competing social policy objectives must be taken into account in making a decision, the decision is non-justiciable. A finding of irrationality becomes impossible, it therefore becomes impossible to decide that the defence of statutory authority does not apply, and no common law duty can exist. 49 irrationality was required before a common law duty can be imposed but that "the court . . . cannot reach the conclusion that the decision was outside the ambit of the statutory discretion" and therefore cannot impose a duty of care.
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On the view expressed in Lord Hutton's dictum above, 6 1 liability may be imposed on decision-makers if they breach a common law duty of care while exercising a discretionary statutory power without a finding that their conduct was irrational. 
F Summary
Given the wide divergence in the approaches taken by the courts, it may be helpful to summarise them .
Dorset Yacht, Anns and Nielsen
Where a decision is made in the exercise of a discretion as to how to achieve a statute' s purpose, a duty of care can exist only if irrationality is established . Irrationality does not suffice for liability but merely defeats the defence of statutory authority. To establish liability, a duty must also arise under ordinary common law principles and have been breached.
Xv Bedfordshire
As for Dorset Yacht, but where a decision 1s non-justiciable and discretionary, liability is impossible.
Heyman per Mason J
Where a decision involves policy, no duty can exist. Otherwise Geddis applies .
Just and Brown per Cory J
Where a decision involves policy, a duty can exist only if the decision is irrational.
Otherwise Geddis applies.
III A POLICY IMMUNITY RULE?
Cory J's rule in Brown and Mason J's rule in Heyman are considered here. These rules assume that different rules of liability are required for the government and private individuals because the former makes policy decisions in the public good whereas the latter do not. They therefore seek to identify a class of policy decisions and to create special rules of liability for this class. They assume that no significant differences exist between decisions made by private individuals and government decisions which do not involve policy, and conclude that ordinary common law principles suffice for both.
22
Finally, they reject Dorset Yacht's rule; the fact that public authorities may have a discretion as to how to further the purposes of a statute is not seen as the basis for differential treatment.
Arguments which have been advanced in support of the creation of special rules of liability for the government are considered below. It is submitted that these arguments
show that differential treatment is necessary. And, in as far as these arguments are valid, it is submitted that the policy immunity rule developed below answers them. The rule argued for is a modified version of that adopted by Cory Jin Brown.
Part IV then considers whether, in the light of the policy immunity rule formulated below, a special rule for discretionary decisions is still required .
A Are special rules needed for the government?
1
Absence of objective standards
The absence of objective standards by which courts can assess the reasonableness of the executive ' s policy decisions is often cited as a reason for denying them the ability to hold policy decisions negligent.
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It may be difficult to assess the reasonableness of a decision to attempt to rehabilitate of borstal trainees by taking them to an island and thereby to increase the risk of harm to the public. However, it seems obvious that not all policy decisions defy characterisation as negligent. For example, a decision to release all dangerous inmates from prisons so as to promote rehabilitation could without difficulty be described as careless. It seems absurd to say that an absence of objective standards would hinder a court from being able to make such a determination. Thus, while the absence of objective standards means that a court should not condemn as unreasonable every policy decision with which it disagrees, there are undeniably some policy decisions which can safely be held negligent. oppressiveness.
Finally, while it may be objected that the clear erroneousness test creates uncertainty and is subjective, it is a necessary compromise as the only alternatives are to immunise all policy decisions no matter how absurd or to immunise none.
The separation of powers
According to this argument, it is Parliament's or, when Parliament chooses to delegate, the executive' s role to determine what the public good requires and to act accordingly. The courts' role is merely to apply the law as Parliament enacts it, and not to usurp the discretionary statutory powers by which Parliament delegates to the executive.
Dissatisfaction with policy decisions is to be remedied via the ballot box. 121 Judicial condemnation of executive action as negligent is therefore said to be inappropriate.
This argument is not persuasive. First, under a Westminister constitutional system the separation of powers is honoured more often in the breach than in the observance.
Inherent in the common law is a judicial legislative capacity. Furthermore, the proposed 11 9 Above n 1, 449. It should be noted that where policy has been taken into account, it may be appropriate to deny immunity if it can be established 01at the policy decision reached would not have been made had, for example, an irrelevant consideration not been taken into account. This is because in such cases it is not 01e policy decision itself which is being challenged, meaning 01at the courts need not find 01at a policy choice was unreasonable. The duty at issue ceases to be a duty not carelessly to do or not do the act which ilie statute authorises and becomes a duty to take care not to act ultra vires. 120 These are some of 01e factors which de Srni01 treats as indicia of Wednesbury mrreasonableness: de Smiili, above n 117, 551-552. Thirdly, the inadequacy of the ballot box as a remedy for administrative matters which are not of overwhelming public concern is reflected in the rapid development of administrative law this century. 124 It is simply unrealistic to expect the government to fear that it will lose an election because of negligent building inspections however grave may be the injustice to those affected by them .
Finally, it is submitted that the argument that the adversarial process is unsuitable for evaluating policy decisions 125 should be rejected . If current rules of evidence and other courtroom procedures are indeed inadequate, then it is open to the courts to modify them.
Inshtutional competence
Feldthusen has argued that negligence actions, at least in respect of a public authority ' s failure to confer a benefit, may result in "astronomical" increases in court costs because "[b Ji lateral dispute resolution is an awkward vehicle with which to assess public policy". 123 Joseph above n 122, 222: " As long as the rule of law prevails, the principle that the executive should be subject to law overrides considerations of a separation of powers" . 
Defensiveness
The most frequently advanced argument for refusing to impose a duty of care on the government is the argument that a duty would cause public servants to act defensively.
This argument can take three forms .
One form of the argument from defensiveness was advanced by Lord Hoffmann in
Stovin. His Lordship stated that imposing a duty of care on a county council to ensure that its roads are safe would, given its limited budget, "distort" its priorities, causing it to increase spending on road improvement and to reduce spending on education and social services. 127 Such distortion interferes with Parliament's delegation to the decision-maker and the separation of powers, and there is force in this argument unless duties of care are also owed in respect of education and social services. However, the proposed policy immunity rule answers this objection as public servants will have no cause for concern or defensive behaviour unless their decisions are clearly erroneous.
Secondly, it has been argued that imposing a duty of care in respect of the exercise of statutory powers which permit the conferral of benefits instead of authorising otherwise tortious conduct may cause public authorities to decide not to exercise such powers in an attempt to avoid liability. This argument is easily answered because public authorities have a public law duty properly to consider whether to exercise a power to confer a benefit. A decision never to exercise a statutory power based solely on the avoidance of liability for negligence in the exercise of the power is likely to be quashed by a court if judicial review is sought. It is submitted that precisely this form of the defensiveness argument was raised in Anns and that Lord Wilberforce employed the very response just developed to refute it.
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In its third form the defensiveness argument states that even if defensiveness in respect of policy decisions can be avoided, the imposition a duty of care will cause undesirable defensiveness in non-policy decisions. This will occur, for example, where building inspectors insist on five foot foundations where three foot foundations are adequate for fear of having overlooked the fact that five foot foundations are actually required. 129 This argument is often overstated. While imposing a duty may cause inefficiency, it may also reduce inefficiency by encouraging the taking of due care.
Whether this third form of the argument justifies denying a duty of care should be considered at the policy balancing stage of the Anns and Caparo tests.
The government does things which individuals cannot do
It could be argued that the government must be treated differently from private individuals because only the government is able or permitted to do or to omit to do certain acts. For example, only the government may operate prisons.
It is submitted that this argument should be rejected. Accepting it would commit one to the odd conclusion that the government would lose its immunity from negligence in relation to prisons if ever a statute were enacted which permitted private individuals to operate prisons. Clearly, any distinction between the rules of liability for the government and private individuals must clearly be based on differences between the policy 128 Above n 35, 754-755 . This view is supported by the fact that his Lordship referred to the public law duty properly to consider whether a power should be exercised after swnmarising the defendant' s argument as follows : "It is said ... that the local authority is w1der no duty to inspect, and this is used as the foundation for an argwnent ... that if it need not inspect at aU, it cannot be liable for negligent inspection : if it were to be held so liable, so it is said, councils would simply decide against inspection" . It is submitted that the words "no duty to inspect" refer to the absence of a public law duty on the defendant council in Anns, and not to the absence of a common law duty of care. If tllis is correct, then criticisms of A nns which assume that Lord Wilberforce argued that the existence of a public law duty properly to consider whether to inspect ipso facto resulted in a duty of care are misconceived: Heyman, above n 12, 19 per Mason J. 129 This "overkill" argwnent was advanced by Lord Keith in Rowling v Takara Properties Ltd, above n 44, 502.
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considerations which bear on the imposition of duties of care on them and on the fact that only the government makes policy decisions.
Pure omissions
As is argued below, the distinction between positive acts and pure omissions has no bearing on the form of the policy immunity rule.
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B The form of the proposed policy immunity rule
The policy immunity rule contended for is outlined in this part of the paper. It is based upon the rule adopted by the Canadian Supreme Court in Just and Brown, but differs in significant ways. The elements of the proposed rule are justified to the extent that they have not been argued for above.
J
Choice
In order to be able to invoke the policy immunity rule, the decision-maker must have a choice as to what to do in the exercise of a statutory power.
Execution of policy decisions
No liability can arise if a policy decision falling within the immunity rule is made and employees are instructed to implement it and they follow their instructions.
1
However, when a policy decision is made and employees are instructed to do a certain act which they forget to do or do carelessly, the employees will not have made a policy decision and the government will not be able to invoke the policy immunity rule in respect of their negligence.
Finally, the view taken by some courts that, once a policy decision has been made, no subsequent decision can be a policy decision is not adopted here. the fact a policy maker who decides on a course of action will not necessarily consider every policy aspect of the task at hand before its implementation commences. Policy matters may require consideration by other personnel once implementation has begun.
Thus, any decision involving policy which meets the requirements set out here should fall within the policy immunity rule.
Policy was actually taken into account
The government must actually have taken policy considerations into account in reaching a decision in order for it to fall within the policy immunity rule. Following One may wonder whether immunity is ever justified for decisions which do not involve policy. It should be noted that the question here is not whether a duty of care should be owed in respect of all government activity which does not involve policy decisions. Even if a decision does not fall within the policy immunity rule, the policy or justice and reasonableness stage of the Anns or Caparo test may nevertheless prevent a duty from arising. The question is thus simply whether where a decision is made pursuant to a statutory power the very fact that the decision is made by the government and that it is made under a statutory power rather than by a private individual not acting under a statutory power should suffice for immunity.
132 Such a suggestion is made in Just, above n 15, 707, 709. For criticism sec MK Woodall "Private Law
It is submitted that it should not. A public authority which, without basing its conduct on policy considerations, acts in such a manner that a private individual in its position would be liable in negligence should be held liable. Why, for example, should a minister who has an enormous budget but who directs that foundations of inadequate thickness be used for a building due to ignorance about building safety be treated differently from a private individual who acts in the same manner and causes harm? The only justification for differential treatment is policy. When policy is absent, there should be no differential treatment because it is not justified by the separation of powers or a lack of objective criteria with which to assess the decision's reasonableness. As was said by the dissent in requirement.
No sub-categorisation of policy decisions
In Just, Cory J distinguished between " high level" policy decisions, such as a decision to build a lighthouse, and those made at a "lower level", such as a decision about how to inspect aircraft parts. It was said that a decision falling within the latter subcategory of policy decisions could attract liability unless "the government agency establishes that it was a reasonable decision in the light of the circumstances". 138 As
Feldthusen correctly points out, drawing such distinctions is "a hopeless task" as there are no obvious criteria for distinguishing among various levels of policy.
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While Just 's reasonableness requirement was rejected in Brown, 140 the difference between the results in Just and Brown, unless explained by an absence of evidence that policy was actually considered in Just, appears to expose another problematic attempt to distinguish among different levels of policy. In Just a highway authority's decision as to how frequently to inspect a slope above a highway for loose rocks was found not to have been a policy decision. 141 By contrast, a highway authority' s decision as to the frequency of shifts for removing black ice was held to have been a policy decision in Brown.
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Such distinctions, which, in the words of Lord Hoffmann in Stovin, are "hardly visible to the naked eye", 143 must be rejected . As his Lordship pointed out, practically every decision, no matter how trivial, can affect a public body ' s budget. 144 It is therefore submitted that every decision in the making of which policy is considered should fall within the policy immunity rule.
It must be appropriate for the decision-maker to take policy into account
While a policy decision can be made at any level, there are some government employees of whose task is no part to make policy decisions although they may have the opportunity to take policy into account in making decisions which they are required to make. Scalia J suggested the requirement proposed here in Gaubert.
145 His Honour said of the dock workers in Dalehite that even if they had performed a careful analysis of the risks and benefits of storing explosive fertiliser in a certain manner, such a decision would not have fallen within s 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act because it was not their task to ponder such things. It should be noted that this requirement does not reintroduce the uncertainty which rejecting the sub-categorisation of policy decisions was intended to avoid. Determining whether an employee' s work involves making policy decisions is quite different from distinguishing between high and low level policy decisions.
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Burden shift
The burden of establishing that policy was taken into account in reaching a certain decision should rest on the government. 147 Such a burden shift is justified by the obvious difficulty which a private plaintiff could face in determining what the government took into account in reaching a decision and by the fact that, as the government routinely keeps records of its decisions for other purposes, it would not be unduly onerous.
Authority for such a burden shift may be drawn, by way of analogy, from Just, where Cory J stated that "a true policy decision may be made at a lower level provided that the government agency establishes that it was a reasonable decision". 
No absolute immunity
It is submitted that policy decisions should not automatically be accorded immunity from negligence liability no matter how absurd they are. Only those which are not clearly erroneous should be immune.
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As was argued above, neither the absence of objective standards nor the separation of powers nor the need to avoid defensiveness mandates absolute immunity. Feldthusen, however, asserts that it is "simply incoherent" to stop short of absolute immunity because it is impossible to determine when a policy choice is negligent. 150 He argues that courts should not demand that every beneficial programme be funded until its "net costs"
146 This is conceded by Feldthusen: above n 126, 22. 147 S Todd The Law of Torts in New Zealand (led, Brooker' s, Wellington, 1991) 240. The autJ10r suggests tJiat the burden of proving tJ1at a decision fell within tJ1e "policy sphere" of the policy/operations rule should rest on the government. See also Fcldthusen, above n 126, 32. d) The decision-maker proves that policy was actually taken into account; and e) It was appropriate for the decision-maker to take policy into account.
3. The duty was breached.
4. The breach caused dan1age.
It should be noted that if a policy decision is found to be clearly erroneous, then, if a duty arises under Caparo, it should be presumed that that duty has been breached. It would be odd to say that a decision was clearly erroneous but that it was made with reasonable care. Furthermore, the policy immunity rule cannot be a "touchstone of argument against the policy immunity rule based on s 6(1)(a), the courts would probably reject it on the basis that Parliament did not turned its mind to the need for such a rule and that the consequences of its rejection would be unacceptable. This is simply the argument from the absence of objective standards discussed above. 166 Lord Dip lock gave the same justification, saying that in balancing the imperatives of rehabilitation and protection of the public "there [ was] no criterion by which a court can assess where the balance lies between the weight to be given to one interest and that to be given to another" . Given Xv Bedfordshire 's definition of discretion, it easy to imagine non-justiciable policy considerations being relevant to a decision which does not qualify as discretionary.
IV THE DEFENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Resource allocation decisions must clearly be made by a school ' s principal in running a
school, yet Lord Browne-Wilkinson cited as an example of a non-discretionary act "the actual running of a school pursuant to the statutory duties". Such decisions need not be irrational in order to lose the protection of the defence of statutory authority because they are not discretionary. Furthermore, they are afforded no protection by Xv Bedfordshire 's non-justiciability rule as this only functions to prevent a discretionary decision from being found to be irrational. 174 It thus appears that non-discretionary policy decisions receive no immunity under Xv Bedfordshire. Why this should be so is difficult to fathom .
Adopting Dorset Yacht's definition of discretion would avoid this problem. However, it too would deny immunity where it is needed. As discussed above, 175 
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The problem is that determining which acts are sufficiently closely related to the purpose for which the power is conferred is a difficult task. The Court in Gaubert found that the FHLBB, having taken control of the Independent American Savings Association (IASA), was furthering the Home Owners ' Loans Act's policy of securing the banking system in taking "day-to-day" decisions in running the IASA. Its conduct therefore fell within the s 2680(a) immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 178 However, the Court said that driving a car while furthering the Act ' s aims was "obviously" not sufficiently connected with the policy of the Act. 179 With respect, this is far from obvious, especially as day-to-day commercial decisions are sufficiently connected with the Act' s purpose. Once it is accepted that irrationality is not needed to create a zone of immunity for policy decisions and that such a zone is better provided by the policy immunity rule, there is no reason to require irrationality instead of merely common law negligence to defeat the defence of statutory authority.
Modern administrative law evolved in response to the relatively recent adoption by Parliament of the practice of conferring upon the executive discretionary statutory powers while placing few restrictions on their use. 184 It is directed at preventing the arbitrary and unfair use of such powers in respect of private individuals. It is concerned principally with promoting the observance of fair procedures in government decision-making, and decisions can be quashed irrespective of whether they breach an applicant's common law rights . 185 For instance, where an applicant's common law rights are in no way affected by the exercise a statutory power to grant someone else a fishing licence, the applicant, provided that his or her interests are in some way affected, may have the decision quashed if the decision-maker failed observe the principles of natural justice.
By contrast, once relieved of the role of providing a zone of permissible policy error, the defence of statutory authority functions solely to determine the extent to which individuals' common law rights are extinguished by the conferral of a statutory power to do or to omit to do a certain act. Where Parliament does not expressly specify the extent to which it wishes to extinguish common law rights, the scope of the defence must be a matter of presumed legislative intent.
Given the presumption against the extinguishment of common law rights except by express language or necessary implication, 186 it is reasonable to accept that Parliament in conferring a statutory power should be presumed to have intended to authorise the 184 Wade, above n 24, 16-21 ; Joseph, above 11 122, 656-657. 185 Wade, above n 24, 3-7; Hogg, above 11 127, 292.
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infringement of common law rights only to the minimum extent necessary. Thus, where
Parliament has authorised the doing of a certain act without expressly extinguishing common law rights, it should be presumed to have intended to extinguish them only to the extent that the commission of a tort is the inevitable consequence of doing what Parliament has authorised. This is Geddis' rule -negligence is never authorised because negligence is never inevitable. 
V EFFECT ON DECIDED CASES
Some of the decisions which are reviewed in part II would not be greatly affected by the adoption of the policy immunity rule and the absence of Dorset Yacht 's rule. This is because they involved strike out applications without a finding of irrationality having been made. However, the significance of the policy immunity rule is not diminished . Its adoption would have a significant effect when cases actually go to trial and on potential plaintiffs when considering whether to sue.
As discussed above, the effect of Dorset Yacht 's rule in Barrett is particularly unfortunate. If Barrett has failed to change the law in England, then if the plaintiff's injuries cannot be traced to non-discretionary acts by the social workers he will fail unless the social workers' conduct meets the notoriously high Wednesbury threshold . By contrast, the plaintiff would probably succeed if the policy immunity rule were adopted . It is unclear whether the result in Brown would change if the policy immunity rule were applied . The decision not to switch from the summer road inspection schedule to the winter schedule may have involved financial considerations. Whether such evidence was provided by the government of British Columbia is unclear from the report of the case. If evidence that policy had actually been considered was presented, the case would fall within the policy immunity rule. The plaintiff would then have to establish that it was morally unacceptable and therefore clearly erroneous to permit the public to use the road without eliminating the risk posed by the falling rocks. This argument might succeed. If policy was not actually considered, the immunity rule would not apply, and, given the prime facie duty which arose in Just, liability would be likely.
Finally, Gaubert would have been decided differently had it arisen for decision under the policy immunity rule. White J for the majority found that although no social or economic policy had been considered by the FHLBB, the s 2680(a) immunity applied because decisions about the day-to-day operation of the IASA were made by the FHLBB in furtherance of the Home Owners' Loan Act's policy of ensuring the stability of the financial system. Under the policy immunity rule, such decisions would not attract immunity because they do not fall within the class of policy decisions. The plaintiff would have succeeded if the FHLBB was negligent.
VI CONCLUSION
It appears clear that the law of negligence cannot, without some modification, provide satisfactory rules for holding the government liable for the careless exercise of its statutory powers. The reason, essentially, is that the government, unlike individuals, must make policy decisions in the public interest. Constitutionally it is inappropriate for the courts to create duties of care which interfere with policy decisions, and assessing whether a policy decision is unreasonable presents practical difficulties. These 
